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Spam emails are a major tool for criminals to distribute malware, conduct
fraudulent activity, sell counterfeit products, etc. Thus, security companies
are interested in researching spam. Unfortunately, due to the spammers’
detection-avoidance techniques, most of the existing tools for spam analysis
are not able to provide accurate information about spam campaigns. More-
over, they are not able to link together campaigns initiated by the same
sender.
F-Secure, a cybersecurity company, collects vast amounts of spam for analy-
sis. The threat intelligence collection from these messages currently involves
a lot of manual work. In this thesis we apply state-of-the-art data-analysis
techniques to increase the level of automation in the analysis process, thus
enabling the human experts to focus on high-level information such as cam-
paigns and actors.
The thesis discusses a novel method of spam analysis in which email messages
are clustered by different characteristics and the clusters are presented as a
graph. The graph representation allows the analyst to see evolving campaigns
and even connections between related messages which themselves have no fea-
tures in common. This makes our analysis tool more powerful than previous
methods that simply cluster emails to sets.
We implemented a proof of concept version of the analysis tool to evaluate the
usefulness of the approach. Experiments show that the graph representation
and clustering by different features makes it possible to link together large
and complex spam campaigns that were previously not detected. The tools
also found evidence that different campaigns were likely to be organized by
the same spammer. The results indicate that the graph-based approach is
able to extract new, useful information about spam campaigns.
Keywords: spam campaigns, mass email, malware, clustering, graph
analysis, threat intelligence
Language: English
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Scope
Electronic mail, also known as email, is a common communication mechanism
that is used by many companies and people. Companies use email to keep
in touch with their clients, promote their goods and services, receive feedback
from clients. People often use email for communication as the default way
of reaching other people. Like any widely used technology, email can also be
misused. Unsolicited email messages, also known as spam, appeared in the
same time as email system appeared. The first spam message was sent on May
1, 1978, by Digital Equipment Corporation to advertise their product to several
hundred users on ARPANET[43]. When the Internet opened for commercial
and personal use in the 90s, spam became a widespread phenomenon. Thus
with the rise of the email system, rose spam. In the first half of 2017, spam
accounted for 54% of all email traffic[27].
Most of the spam emails are intended to aggressively advertise goods or
websites, and they do not do much harm except wasting people’s time and re-
sources. However, besides that, spam serves an important role in cyber attacks
and distribution of malicious software. According to Symantec research, it is
the most frequently used mechanism to deliver malware. Also, their research
states that a user is twice as likely to get infected by malware through email
than to get infected through a malicious website.[27] Spam is also used for
various types of fraudulent activities targeted at businesses. According to a
recent analysis by FBI[38], between 2013 and 2016 years, businesses suffered
losses of over $5 billion because of email fraud. These consequences of spam
make it an essential attack vector for security service companies to invest their
analytic resources.
Information security companies are interested in understanding trends in
spam and in predicting what can happen and how to mitigate the threats.
Getting a representative overview of spam is a task that requires some prepa-
ration. To do that, security companies maintain email honeypots and buy vast
amounts of spam from specialized providers. Getting as many malware and
phishing samples as possible and updating the detection databases on time can
significantly reduce the damage caused by malware and fraud to the security
company’s clients.
Malicious attachments and URLs is not the only information that can be
extracted from spam. Often spam discloses enough information to group differ-
ent spam campaigns by a common sender. Identifying senders not only allows
authorities to take actions against them but also to understand the spammers’
intentions and to improve automated detection mechanisms.
One key thing about spam is that it is often not qualitative but quantita-
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tive. Even if only 0.1% of users opens a spam email and follows the link, it
brings one client for every 1000 messages. Moreover, spam is so cheap that
one client can payoff millions of messages. According to Symantec’s report,
every 9th user had a malicious email sent to him during first half of 2017.[27]
Mass character of spam leads to one of the technical problems of spam anal-
ysis: massive amounts of data. F-Secure, the case company in this research,
receives tens of thousands of messages every day and also purchases spam from
companies which specialize in collecting it. Without special data mining tools,
it is practically impossible to get a broad view of the collected data. Currently,
such tools are not available on the market and companies that are interested
in researching spam are forced to develop their own approaches according to
their needs.
This thesis aims at making the analysis of email messages easier, providing
tools and approaches to present and correlate email messages in such way that
researchers can analyze large sets of email messages.
Two fields of computer science had been used to address this problem: ma-
chine learning and graph analysis. Machine learning, specifically clustering,
provides ways of grouping objects that are similar according to some selected
set of features. Most of the email messages differ insignificantly, therefore, al-
lowing to combine thousands of similar messages into quite well-defined groups.
This methodology can frequently provide insights about ongoing spam cam-
paigns.
Another problem addressed in this research is data visualization. Graphs
are chosen for the visualization of the clustered emails as they allows analysts
to connect objects that have no direct link to each other but are connected
through networks of other objects. The graph-based approach might disclose
some information about the likeliness of having a common source behind both
clusters.
This thesis attempts to answer the following research question:
How clustering techniques can facilitate analysis of unsolicited bulk
messages?
The main research question can be divided into the following questions:
• What features can be used for clustering?
• Does clustering spam emails provide better visibility over spam cam-
paigns?
• How can the clustering results be visualized?
The primary focus of the thesis lies on the novel method of correlating bulk
email messages and presenting them to the user in such way that representa-
tion can provide additional information about the email senders that was not
visible by inspecting the individual emails or even individual clusters. Feature
selection is an essential part of the research as it determines the quality of the
clustering, on which the presentation part relies. The developed tool is not yet
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a complete product but helps to answer research questions and to evaluate the
novel method of analyzing emails.
Although this thesis is focused on researching spam, the underlying analysis
and presentation techniques can be applied to other types of objects.
The following section provides more details about spam, clustering algo-
rithms and discusses relevant researches. After the background section, re-
quirements for the tool are introduced. Next three chapters discuss a selection
of the algorithms and their parameters, practical implementation of the soft-
ware, and the obtained results with use cases. The discussion chapter explains
the overall value of the results, how they influence the research area, and what
future research directions can be taken. The conclusion chapter sums up the
research.
Chapter 2
Background and related work
Email spam has existed for a long time and has a significant impact on human-
ity. Therefore, spam is a well-explored area with many effective approaches to
spam filtering.
This chapter provides background information about the email, spam, and
researches on the topic of spam clustering. The first section of the chapter
describes electronic mail, explains main concepts, protocols, and formats. The
second section discusses spam focusing on spam filtering techniques and tech-
niques to avoid spam filters. The third section focuses on a comparison of
commonly utilized clustering algorithms. The last section discusses researches
on spam clustering and classification.
2.1 Email
Electronic mail is a method of exchanging text messages between computer
users. The core concept of email is that everyone can send messages to ev-
eryone. Email protocol was designed in such way that the whole system is
decentralized. This section explains how email works.
2.1.1 Email protocol
Email network consists of servers that store, transfer and process email mes-
sages. Email messages are transferred by Simple Mail Transfer Protocol servers.
SMTP allows establishing communication and routing between different email
users only using an address from an email and information from DNS servers.[22]
This protocol operates within computer networks in such way that interlocu-
tors do not have to be online simultaneously. It also allows relaying messages
across different networks.[21]
Although it is possible to send and receive emails using only SMTP servers,
common use case includes a mail retrieval service, such as IMAP or POP3.
Mail retrieval services provide an easier way of working with incoming messages
by storing and maintaining a mailbox. Services are usually run on the same
server as SMTP server and allow users to fetch messages from the system.
The difference between IMAP and POP3 is that IMAP stores messages on
the server allowing to access mailbox from different devices, and POP3 reads
messages, deleting them from the server.[26, 4]
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Although most of the email clients support POP3 and IMAP, some email
clients introduce their own protocols for fetching data from mail servers.
Figure 2.1 depicts simplified example of an email message transfer:
1. Email client, for example, MS Outlook, connects to the known SMTP
server, running on the host A. Then email client tells the address of the
recipient and an email message contents to the connected SMTP server.
2. SMTP server A requests DNS server to get the IP address of the recipi-
ent’s SMTP server.
3. SMTP server A connects to the SMTP server B to send information
received from Outlook email client.
4. SMTP server B receives the message and hands it to the IMAP service.
5. Email client 2 connects to the IMAP service, authenticates, and fetches
new messages. Now user can see these messages in his email client.
Figure 2.1: Common email transferring process
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Email payload does not change during the transfer. However, there is
one exception: each SMTP server has to append "Received" header storing
information about the current SMTP server to the email. It is done to track
the route of the message and find slow servers. Next section elaborates on
message format and explains this header more thoroughly.
2.1.2 Email format
An email message is essentially a sequence of characters split into fixed-length
lines. Lines are separated with "CRLF" line break.[34] Each email message
consists of headers and a body. Body is optional and can be omitted.
A header is essentially a set of lines consisting of printable US-ASCII char-
acters. It is separated from the body with an empty line. Each line of the
email must not be longer than 998 characters and should not be longer than
78 characters. Each header field starts with a field name and is followed by a
colon. A line is terminated by "CRLF."
The body of a message is simply lines of US-ASCII characters with several
limitations: line cannot be longer than 998 characters, and "CRLF" can be
used only for line breaks.[33] RFC 5322 references several other RFCs that
greatly extend specification of a body, allowing it to encode non-textual mes-
sage bodies[12], multi-part message bodies[13, 2], and body/headers in differ-
ent character sets[25].
Header fields are logically divided into groups by a purpose. RFC 5322 de-
fines eight groups of header fields: Origination Date Fields, Originator Fields,
Destination Address Fields, Identification Fields, Informational Fields, Resent
Fields, and Optional Fields.[33]
The Origination Date Field
Orig-date. Specifies time and date when the user decided to submit the email
to the mailing system.
Originator Fields
From. Specifies the author or authors of the message represented as a comma-
separated set of mailboxes.
Sender. Defines sender of the message. This field must be present if "From"
field has more than one author. This mailbox is directly responsible for sending
the message.
Reply-To. Optional field that contains a comma-separated set of email ad-
dresses for the reply.
Destination Address Fields
To. Specifies primary recipients of the message.
Carbon Copy. Specifies addresses that will also receive the email although they
are not primary recipients.
Blind Carbon Copy. Specifies recipients of the message whose addresses should
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not be revealed to other recipients. It is achieved by sending separate messages
to each of the recipients removing the BCC field from the email.
Identification Fields
Message-Id. Contains a unique identifier of the message. Must present in each
email.
In-Reply-To & References fields. Fields that are used in replies to carry ID of
the original message. References field is filled with the content of the parent’s
references field, In-Reply-To is filled with parent’s "Message-ID."
Informational Fields
Subject. A common field that describes the topic of the email message. For
replies, it is common to inherit the parent’s subject adding "Re: " substring at
the beginning of the new subject.
Comments. Not mandatory field that may contain comments to the message
body.
Keywords. Comma-separated set of important words that might be useful for
the recipient.
Resent Fields
Fields Resent-Date, Resent-From, Resent-Sender, Resent-To, Resent-Cc, Resent-
Bcc, and Resent-Message-ID are used only when original message was reintro-
duced to the electronic mail system by another user. These fields are purely
informational and are not used for routing the message.
Trace Fields
When a message reaches an SMTP server, the server must append some trace
information to that message to identify the sender host, receiver host, and the
date and time according to the current host.
Received. Mandatory field to help keep track of emails routing through relays.
When SMTP server processes the email, it must add a Received field with
information about itself, for example, its IP address, the IP address of the
previous SMTP server, and a current time. It helps to find slow relays and
spoofed IP addresses.
Return-Path. An optional field that contains an email address to return email
to. A message indicating failed delivery will be returned to this email. Some-
times it is removed by the last SMTP server on the route.
Optional Fields
A client is allowed to add any fields to an email if the field name is made up of
the printable US-ASCII characters, followed by a colon, followed by any text
that conforms to the unstructured syntax.[33, p. 30]
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2.2 Spam
Unsolicited messages sent by email are called email spam. Spam has been a
burden to the email system for a long time. According to Symantec report,
amount of spam during the first half of 2017-th reached 54%, and one of
every nine emails was malicious.[27] Email is still one of the prevalent vectors
of malware distribution. Therefore, it is very important for security-related
companies to analyze this source of information.
Basically, any unwanted email message is called spam. Thus it can be very
hard to distinguish spam message from a real email message.
2.2.1 Collecting spam
Spam is easy to get without putting any effort but getting a complete repre-
sentation of what is happening in the spam world is a complicated task. Five
methods of harvesting spam are commonly used.[31]
Botnet malware observation
Putting a botnet malware into a sandbox and collecting all emails sent from
it. This method provides the clearest spam as it comes directly from the
source[31].
MX honeypot
Configuring SMTP server to accept all messages that were sent to it. The
goal is to receive all emails, even those that were generated by a spammer. To
let spammers know that domain has an email server, email addresses hosted
on that domain must be collected by a spammer first. One good example
of addresses distribution is temporary mailbox services that are used by real
people to avoid usage of their real email addresses when they register some-
where. People use these temporary email services to register in other services
where they do not need to receive any emails from that service. Accepting
all incoming messages allows receiving significant amounts of spam that was
intended for the owners of temporary addresses. Nobody will read spam on
these accounts thus spammers might filter them for not being active.
Seeded honey accounts
Email addresses are created on third-party email resources and seeded by the
owner of the feed. This technique provides a better diversity of domain names
and, in many cases, cannot be filtered by domain names from spammers’
databases. Such accounts are also not active thus will be quickly filtered by
advanced spammers.
Human identified
Usually, it is a real email service with real users who can flag an incoming email
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as spam manually. Messages flagged by real users are often high-quality cam-
paigns as they manage to evade automated spam filters and get to the users.
The downside is that such feeds are not scalable as to provide larger feeds they
require to get more people using the email service.[31] Another downside is
that different people have a different definition of spam so false negatives rate
will be significant.
Domain blacklists
Domain blacklists are manually maintained feeds that can be driven by differ-
ent combinations of spam source data based on the organization that maintains
them[31].
2.2.2 Spam statistics
Figure 2.2 depicts rise in spam over last several years. Comparing to 2015
and 2016 years, spam rates increased in 2017. Unsolicited email messages
composed more than half of the whole email volume during 2017 year.[27]
Figure 2.2: Percentage of spam
The increase in spam is not equal for all sectors. Manufacturing, mining
sectors, construction, and retail trade targeted spam increased 50% in the first
six months of 2017, according to Symantec spam report.[27]
Spam is mostly used to advertise goods or services, distribute malware and
deliver phishing messages. Here are some key facts from the Symantec report:
• Infection of email users happens twice more often through emails than
through all other infection methods
• 11% of all email users received malware in the 2017 year
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 10
• 8000 businesses each month are being targeted by Business Email Com-
promise (BEC) scam through spam. Targeted organizations receive on
average 5.2 BEC emails per month
2.2.3 Spam filtering techniques
In the beginning, spam was very simple. Anyone could send millions of mes-
sages to anyone just knowing his or her email address. Then first spam filtering
techniques started to appear. Spammers also had to improve their techniques.
This section serves the purpose of explaining the situation in the spam market
and what difficulties can be met during spam clustering.
SPF and DKIM
Sending an email, a spammer can put any email address into the "From" field
and any domain name into the HELO command. SPF and DKIM are two
common techniques that allow binding IP address to a domain name.
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) technique allows to check if sending host
is allowed to send messages using some domain.[46] To enable SPF check do-
main owner must add a DNS record that will define which IP addresses are
authorized to use the domain name as an identifier.[48]
Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) is another way to perform such veri-
fication, but instead of storing authorized hosts in DNS, a public key is stored
as DNS record.[5] Then to each email "DKIM-Signature" field is added. This
field stores signed information about the domain that is later compared against
"From" field’s domain. To check that information is valid, a receiver uses the
public key stored in DNS record.
Real Time Black Lists
Real-Time Black Lists (RBL) or DNS Black Lists (DNSBL) is a spam mit-
igation technique described in RFC 5782. It is used to drop messages that
came from sources that are suspected of sending massive amounts of spam.[24]
These sources are not necessary servers that were created by spammers but
also can be misconfigured legit SMTP-servers abused by spammers.
RBL uses DNS infrastructure to store blocked IP addresses, and any SMTP
server can access these records from standard DNS servers or specialized servers
like RBLDNS.
This method also blocks SMTP servers that allow sending spam through
them, for example, open SMTP relays that relay all traffic that comes in with-
out checking the IP address correctness. The Internet is being scanned to
detect such SMTP nodes to add them to the RBL before spammers start us-
ing them.
Greylisting
For each received email, SMTP server composes three pieces of data called
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triplet: sender’s IP address, sender’s email address, and recipient’s email ad-
dresses.[47] When the recipient receives a message with the unseen triplet, it
rejects the message. It is an effective strategy because spammers often do not
have proper infrastructure to process bounced messages and send them again.
Moreover, even if they will try to resend the message in some time, they will
be already filtered by RBL because, during the delay time, the spammer was
sending messages to other clients.
Razor and DCC
Razor is a distributed network for checking spam body contents that allow de-
tecting texts seen in spam without disclosing the real message.[32] Razor uses a
fuzzy signature matching algorithm called Nilsimsa. Nilsimsa creates a statis-
tical model of a message or part of a message in such way that small automatic
mutations made to the message do not change the output significantly.[6]
Razor depends on user feedback about spam messages. If spam messages
are not reported as spam by Razor users, Razor will give many false negatives.
Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse (DCC) is a similar way of content
blacklisting, but it does not rely on user’s feedback. Instead, it counts similar
messages and considers all mass-sent texts as spam. So without white-listing,
it will have a high rate of false-positives.[40]
Spamassassin
Spamassassin is a powerful tool for detecting spam. It is configured by adding
rules where each rule has a score, and all rules are run for every received
email.[11] Scores of these rules are summed up and compared to the threshold
value. If the sum is higher than a threshold value, then the message is con-
sidered spam. Users can add their own rules which are in the form of regular
expression. A rule can be run against all parts of the message, not only body
or header. Spamassassin also allows adding more sophisticated rules and plug-
ins for all kinds of spam checks such as statistical analysis tests, RBL tests,
Bayesian filtering, and domain name verification.
Bayesian filtering
Bayesian spam filtering is based on a statistical theorem that estimates a proba-
bility of an event. It can be configured in different ways, but two most common
approaches are to detect words and letter sequences.[1]
Words analysis is rather simple. Bayes filter has to be trained on spam
samples and legit messages. Using information from the training, it is possible
to see which words are often used in spam emails and which are not. Bayesian
filter adapts to new spammers techniques very fast, for example, when spam-
mers started using the word "f-r-e-e" instead of "free" to avoid Spamassassin
word filters, Bayesian filter managed to learn that "f-r-e-e" is a good indication
for spam emails because it is mostly used in spam.
The Bayesian spam filter is also able to detect randomly generated texts
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that spammers often add to their messages to avoid having completely simi-
lar messages. It is possible because the probability of having a pair of letters
together is not same for all pairs and generated text will not have this dis-
tribution of probability. One example of software using the Bayesian filter is
DSPAM.[17]
2.2.4 Filters evasion techniques
Spamming techniques are aimed against spam filtering techniques. Filtering
was the reason why filtering techniques evolved, and evolution of filtering tech-
niques lead to improvement of spamming techniques.
One interesting thing to keep in mind is that email servers configured differ-
ently thus making even obsolete spamming methods to reach some percentage
of the recipients. So the existence of anti-spamming techniques that is hard to
avoid does not mean that all email servers will apply the new technique and
spammers will have to find some new technique immediately. The process of
applying new methods takes time.
Email forgery
Changing sender’s address or domain in an email message is called email
forgery or email spoofing. It is possible because email protocols do not have
any authentication mechanisms in them by design.
To send an email using SMTP, a client has to provide two core pieces of
information that compose "envelope" part of the email message. These pieces
are:
• RCPT TO - specifies email addresses of recipients
• MAIL FROM - specifies the sender that will be presented to the recipient
in the "Return-path" field of the email message
If SMTP server accepts the envelope, the client can send the DATA part of
the email that includes "From" and "Sender" fields that will be shown to the
sender. As a result, a receiver will see the wrong email and may respond to the
wrong mailbox. Another consequence is that the spammers can exploit Non-
Delivery reports by forging "Reply-to" field in such way, that Non-Delivery
report will be sent to the wrong mailbox. Such wrongly routed emails are
called backscatters".
In terms of this research, it means that often sender fields cannot be trusted
if they are not verified with DKIM or SPF.
Hiding text in email body
One way of confusing spam filters is adding fake text to the message body.
Many flavors of such technique, but the concept stays the same: make spam
filters check a text, that is not part of real payload intended to be shown to a
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recipient. The simplest way to do that is to add some generated text to the
body after the payload text and to put padding after the payload. In most
cases, recipients will not see the appended fake text if they do not scroll the
message to its end.[40] Adding text from Wikipedia articles can also confuse
Bayesian filters as suspicious part of the text will be smaller compared to the
amount of legit text.
Another way is to add generated text as HTML at the beginning of the
message, making it the same color as background thus making text invisible
to a human. Some spam filters will parse generated text as legit body text,
and it can lead to a false negative result.
Generating subject and body text
Message subject line and body text are the way for the spammer to say some-
thing to a receiver of a message. Many anti-spam techniques have been devel-
oped to track and provide real-time information about spam campaigns based
on subject lines and body messages. For example, Razor, discussed above,
generates hashes of text parts and checks if they had been seen in other emails
submitted before. This section discusses common ways of evading text-based
blocking techniques.
Writing millions of similar subjects and texts would be the perfect solution
for the spammers, but it requires an enormous amount of resources that will
not pay-off. Spam has to be cheap to be profitable. Thus an automated
generation of texts is much more preferable for the spammers.
One of the techniques for text generation is called synonym swapping. Syn-
onyms swapping is a method allowing to generate sets of sentences that have
the same meaning but use different words from a pre-defined set of tokens. It
is done by splitting the sentence into several parts and picking a set of possible
interchangeable words or collocations.[40] Splitting message on more parts and
creating bigger sets of words for each sentence allows to increase the number
of possible combinations significantly.
A table is the simplest form of the source structure. Another way of defin-
ing the pattern is to create a finite state machine where each node is a set of
tokens. Example of such state machine can be seen in Appendix 1. By going
from root node through the graph and picking random token from each node,
a program can generate different sentences that will have the same meaning.
Table 1 shows examples of generated texts.
Generating URLs
URL addresses in emails serve two purposes: track which recipients were inter-
ested enough to click the link and to provide some easier way for a user to get
to the provided service or get exposed to malicious content. Therefore links
cannot be obfuscated in such way that they stop working. It makes parsing
and analyzing them an easier task for spam filters compared to the text-based
filters.
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URL consists of three parts:
1. Scheme - identifies the protocol used to fetch the content.
Spammers often use HTTP scheme because it does not require to get
HTTPS certificate for the server. Many legitimate websites often use
HTTP as well.
2. Hostname - points to a machine running the web service. It is also
referred as a domain name. To get a domain name, web service owner
has to register it through a domain name registrar at the organization
called ICANN. The usual cost of owning a domain name for a year varies
from $10 to $35.
Hostnames cost too much to make them unique for each email message,
but sub-domains can be generated for free. DNS supports wildcard DNS
records that will redirect all requests to sub-domains to a single server
thus making the generation of sub-domains an easy option of randomizing
the domain name. Comparing domain names between different messages
can be tricky due to sub-domain generation.
Some domain owners provide their sub-domains to other people, so if two
emails have the same domain name but different sub-domains it does not
necessarily mean that the same person sent them. Fortunately, it is not
common in spam for some reason.
3. Path and Query. It includes resource location and query for that re-
source. It is possible to make it random for each recipient, however, due
to the implementation of the software used for displaying the content,
the pattern of this part of URL often stays the same.
Apart from generating sub-domains and randomizing the query format, spam-
mers often use URL shortening. Several services are commonly used such as
"bit.ly" and "goo.gl." These services allow creating links that will redirect users
to any other link. Use of such services can also thwart using URLs inside
message bodies as the domain will not be seen without following the shortened
link.
2.3 Clustering algorithms
Clustering is an analysis method to discover groupings in a data set.[20] This
section provides background information for common clustering algorithms
that had been considered for the research and discusses their advantages and
disadvantages.
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2.3.1 K-Means
K-Means clusters data by randomly putting points, or centroids, across the
dataset and moving them each iteration closer to the closest cluster’s center.
After converging, points are set again. After N iterations, the best result is
selected according to the evaluation function. The objective of the algorithm
is to find:
argmin
s
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Si
||x− µi||2 = argmin
s
k∑
i=1
|Si|V arSi (2.1)
Where x - data points, k - the number of result clusters, S - sets of points
forming clusters, µ - mean of a set.
K-Means requires two arguments: number of centroids and number of it-
erations.
Disadvantages of K-Means:[36]
• Clusters must be convex
• Requires clusters to have a center of mass and for each point to have a
set of coordinates. Needs vectorization of the data
• In rare cases, the algorithm can give a not optimal result because it
involves random selection of centroids
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2.3.2 DBSCAN
Density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN) is a
density-based clustering algorithm that clusters together closely lying points.
DBSCAN introduces the concept of core points, composing dense clusters.
Result clusters also include points that are not core points but are neighbors
of at least one of core points. Outliers do not have any core point neighbors.
Figure 2.3 depicts example cluster. A point is a core point, B and C are parts
of the cluster but not core points, and N point is an outlier.
Figure 2.3: DBSCAN example
DBSCAN requires two parameters:
• ε or EPS - maximum distance between neighbours
• MinPts or min_samples - minimum neighbor samples to consider the
point to be a core point
Disadvantages:
• Not entirely deterministic
Non-core points that are reachable from different clusters can be assigned
randomly depending on the order of data processing.
• Scalability issues
Many implementations of DBSCAN are not well optimized. Also, the
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algorithm has average runtime complexity of O(n log n) and worst-case
complexity of O(n2).[19] When working with not vectorized data, im-
plementations often require pre-built distance matrix that requires min-
imum O(n2/2) for symmetrical distances.
2.3.3 Hierarchical clustering
Hierarchical clustering is a set of clustering algorithms, the main concept of
which is to build new clusters by separating existing ones or delete clusters by
merging them. Hierarchy is often represented by a tree where leaves of some
node are components of the same cluster. Figure 2.4 depicts an example tree.
Agglomerate clustering is a hierarchical clustering that uses a bottom-up ap-
proach. In the beginning, all nodes are considered clusters of one node. Each
iteration, clusters are being merged into bigger clusters.
Figure 2.4: Tree representation of a hierarchical clustering
Disadvantages:
• Rich gets richer. Big clusters tend to grow faster
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• Computational and memory complex. Has O(n3) computational com-
plexity and O(n2) memory complexity [7]
2.4 Related work
This chapter is dedicated to researches on the subject of "Email Clustering."
Each section describes one approach to the problem and overviews existing
papers, evaluating results of each approach.
2.4.1 Hierarchical approaches
"Spam campaign detection, analysis, and investigation"[9] research proposes
an approach based on frequent pattern tree (FPTree) algorithm. Authors con-
sider 6 different features.
Content Type. Common content types are "text/plain", "application/octet-
stream", "multipart/mixed", "text/html", etc.
Attachment Names. Names of the email attachments as a string.
Character Set. Roughly represents the spam language. For example, "windows-
1251" usually used for Cyrillic alphabets.
Subject. Email subject as a string.
URL Tokens. Each URL is split into features such as hostname, path, and
parameters.
Email Layout. Each email body is converted into a sequence of charac-
ters such as "T" (Text), "U" (URL), and "N" (newline).
FPTree is a tree where all nodes represent features and their frequency.[15]
Each path from a root to a leaf represents an email. All children of the node
X are extracted from emails that have all features from root to X.
Figure 2.5 depicts an example of how FPTree is used to work with emails.
As can be seen from email subjects, all emails share the common topic.
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Figure 2.5: FPTree example
Evaluation of the clustering is also present in the paper. Authors used
three methods of evaluation that rely on the text similarities: W-shingling,
Content Triggered Piecewise Hashing, and Locality-Sensitive Hashing. Figure
2.6 shows results of the evaluation. The vertical axis represents the score of
each metric and horizontal axis represent campaigns sorted by their similarity
scores. As we can see from evaluation, about 30% of campaigns have a quite
low similarity score.
This method relies on email patterns and does not rely on actual texts thus
it will cluster campaigns that have completely different bodies but constructed
using the same pattern.
Also, spammers can evade such technique by generating invisible parts of
HTML that will change the pattern significantly.
Figure 2.6: FPTree campaigns similarity evaluation
"Fast and Effective Clustering of Spam Emails based on Structural Similar-
ity"[37] yet another tree-related approach for clustering emails. It introduces
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Categorical Clustering Tree (CCTree) algorithm that utilizes 21 features ex-
tracted from each email message. Features are mostly related to the email
contents, such as number of links, number of images, number of attachments,
body and subject language, email message size, number of words in a body,
types of attachments, and some other similar features. Full set of features is
shown in table 2.1.
Attribute Description
RecipientNumber Number of recipients addresses.
NumberOfLinks Total links in email text.
NumberOfIPBasedLinks Links shown as an IP address.
NumberOfMismatchingLinks Links with a text different from the real link.
NumberOfDomainsInLinks Number of domains in links.
AvgDotsPerLink Average number of dots in link in text.
NumberOfLinksWithAt Number of links containing "@".
NumberOfLinksWithHex Number of links containing hex chars.
SubjectLanguage Language of the subject.
NumberOfNonAsciiLinks Number of links with non-ASCII chars.
IsHtml True if the mail contains html tags.
EmailSize The email size, including attachments.
Language Email language.
AttachmentNumber Number of attachments.
AttachmentSize Total size of email attachments.
AttachmentType File type of the biggest attachment.
WordslnSubject Number of words in subject.
CharslnSubject Number of chars in subject.
ReOrFwdlnSubject True if subject contains "Re" or "Fwd".
NonAsciiCharslnSubject Number of non ASCII chars in subject.
ImagesNumber Number of images in the email text.
Table 2.1: Features extracted from each email
The main concept is the same as in FPTree approach, but all features are
categorical. To convert numerical values into categories, ChiMerge discretiza-
tion method is used.
This paper is valuable because of the features that were utilized as they
mostly relate to the structure of the document and not to exact resources.
Also, the big number of features is highlighted as one of the advantages of this
work.
"Mining Spam Email to Identify Common Origins for Forensic
Application"[45] is yet another hierarchical approach to work with spam.
Research consists of two parts: hierarchical clustering and fixing false positives.
For hierarchical clustering, two features have been used: subject lines and
domain names extracted from URLs. The first iteration of hierarchical clus-
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tering combines all messages that have the same subject. The second itera-
tion merges clusters that have the same URLs in bodies with a single-linkage
clustering algorithm. Single-linkage clustering algorithm clusters two nodes
together if they have at least one connection between the elements of different
clusters. After the second iteration, researchers noticed that one cluster has
67% of the emails with URLs.
To resolve false positives, researchers applied graph approach. They created
a vertex for each domain in the biggest cluster and an edge for each common
subject between two domains. This approach allows finding weakly connected
subgraphs that are connected only by several edges and separating them to
split the cluster into smaller clusters. The main idea is that campaigns that
accidentally happen to have the same subject will be weakly connected because
the probability of sending messages with the same subjects is low. By applying
this technique, researchers managed to reduce the number of clusters and make
them more related.
This paper partially inspired approach applied in this research as it also
utilizes graphs to correlate different features together. However, the approach
suggested in this thesis differs significantly from what was proposed in "Mining
Spam Email to Identify Common Origins for Forensic Application".
2.4.2 Text based clustering approach
"Clustering Spam Campaigns with Fuzzy Hashing" [3] uses fuzzy hashing to
cluster emails into campaigns. Fuzzy hashing is used because spammers often
slightly change email messages to evade spam filters. Thus researchers propose
approach depicted in figure 2.7 that allows to cluster new messages into existing
clusters and create new clusters if a message cannot be assigned to an existing
cluster.
Figure 2.7: Fuzzy hashing clustering process
Context triggered piecewise hashing (CTPH) is used to hash each message.
To compare two hashes, researchers used weighted edit distance.
Each new message is compared against all existing clusters using above
metric and assigned to a cluster with the highest similarity rate if the simi-
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larity is bigger than the constant threshold. If the similarity is less than the
threshold, a new cluster is created.
The computation cost is low because the method relies on a simple hash,
although it still requires pair-wise comparison among two hashes to obtain a
similarity score.[3] This paper does not provide research of how adding random
invisible text changes effectiveness of the algorithm.
After empirically selecting the threshold and clustering 550000 samples,
researchers got 118760 clusters. Such big number of clusters researchers explain
by the diversity of the dataset. It also might be explained by text obfuscation
methods applied by spammers.
Chapter 3
Tool requirements
The purpose of the developed software is to show how the suggested approach
can be utilized in a real environment on real data. Although the tool is just
a proof of concept, usability is an important part of it. If researchers have
problems using the tool, it can be hard to evaluate its advantages for them.
Thus, before creating a user interface, few questions had been asked, and few
core requirements developed. This chapter describes requirements suggested
by the researchers.
3.1 Functional requirements
Functional requirements determine what system’s behaviour: what system
supposed to do, what functionality supposed to implement.
FR1: Clustering
Emails sharing common features must be grouped together.
FR2: Searching
A user must be able to work with the results of clustering and be able to search
the data by different attributes.
3.2 Non-functional requirements
Non-functional requirements describe properties of the system. Usability and
performance are often part of non-functional requirements[39].
NFR1: Performance
The system must be able to provide browsing functionality in real time.
NFR2: Visualization
Data must be presented through a graphical interface.
NFR3: Learning curve
The learning curve for the instrument must be reasonable. A researcher should
be able to work with the data with less than one-day training.
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Chapter 4
Clustering algorithms and visu-
alization
In unprocessed raw format, email messages are text documents stored in a
database or a file system. To work with the data, researchers often parse
emails and put valuable features into some databases or search engines like
Elastic Search. Search engines allow to easily search through the data and
build simple clusters using parsed features. However, loading all the data into
the database costs a significant amount of money and loading more than a
year worth of data, even omitting attachments and message bodies, might
be too expensive for a company, especially because it still lacks methods for
presenting the data in a way that researcher will not be overwhelmed with the
it.
Researchers’ main aim is to get information about running campaigns.
Spammers often share features inside a single campaign and sometimes even
between different campaigns.[3] Such features can be meaningful parts of email
bodies, message templates, used software, IP addresses, email subjects, domain
names within the message, and other characteristics of an email message that
is hard to change randomly. These features can be used for clustering.
Some campaigns last for quite a long time[3] and undergo different changes
to their features to avoid spam filters.[29] Spammers often try to obfuscate
some features in such way that it is practically impossible to cluster them by
an obfuscated feature. Therefore clustering should be done in such way that
email messages will be connected even if one of the features is obfuscated or
changed.
One of the solutions might be clustering by different features and searching
for overlapping clusters. Thus if features change during the campaign not
simultaneously, messages will still be connected with other clusters.
This chapter discusses the selection of features and clustering algorithms.
Visualization of the clusters is being discussed at the end of the chapter.
4.1 Feature selection for clustering
This section enumerates features extracted from the messages. Each feature’s
significance is discussed. For some of the valuable features, clustering algo-
rithms are implemented and tested on the dataset to select optimal parame-
ters. These parameters are used later in the implementation chapter. Figure
4.1 depicts all considered approaches as a mind map.
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Figure 4.1: Considered clustering features and approaches
4.1.1 Subjects
A subject line is often present in spam messages. It is the first thing that
receiver sees in the inbox, so it has to be human-readable and enchanting for
a recipient to open the email. A spammer can change a subject line during a
campaign, but often meaning stays the same. The technique called synonym
swapping, described in 2.2.4 section, allows to generate meaningful subjects
and bodies with a low similarity between different email messages. However,
it is rarely used because it demands a human effort to compose such table. On
practice, spam subjects from one campaign look the same, and most of the
messages can be clustered only according to the similarity of subject lines.
Clustering. Clustering by subjects is done in 4 steps:
1. Parse subjects from email messages. This includes decoding the subject
and converting it into readable Unicode text.
2. Cut subject line to 78 characters. Cutting subject lines not only improves
performance but also is related to RFC standard. RFC states that fields
should not be longer than 78 characters[33], therefore, longer subjects
are often cut by RFC-compliant email clients.
3. Create n2 distance matrix with all distances between all messages.
4. Run DBSCAN clustering on calculated distance matrix with learned pa-
rameters.
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Levenshtein distance is used as similarity metric for subject lines because
changes made to campaigns are often insignificant and limited to adding or
changing words or punctuation.
DBSCAN is a clustering algorithm that works by separating low-density
areas from high-density areas. It had been selected for clustering because of
the next properties:
• No vectorization needed
Selected distance metric does not allow to generate vectors for the mes-
sages, but it can be used to generate distance matrices for the whole
set.
• No cluster number estimation needed
The algorithm must work with any amount of clusters and data without
the need to revise data each time to determine parameters for the algo-
rithm. DBSCAN allows setting constant density which is related to the
similarity of subject lines.
• Shape of clusters can be non-convex
If synonym swapping, discussed in 2.2.4, is used DBSCAN will be able
to cluster them by finding subjects that have only a few different words
building a bridge between completely different subjects but created using
same synonyms table.
Estimation of Clustering Parameters. DBSCAN requires two parameters
to define density of clusters: EPS - maximum distance between neighbours and
MinPts - minimum neighbours for sample to be considered a core sample.
Estimation of the parameters is a simple optimization task. Iterating pa-
rameters through possible values is one of the existing approaches to determine
parameters of clustering algorithms.[10] Both parameters were iterated sepa-
rately, and the optimal value was determined. With MinPts value equal to
2, EPS value was iterated from 0 to 1 with 0.01 step. After determining the
optimal EPS, MinPts was iterated from 1 to 10, keeping EPS optimal.
Test set had to be created to evaluate the clustering. 600 samples were
labeled manually into 56 clusters. Manual labeling was performed according
to many different features, not only subject lines. In some cases, subject lines
were completely different for samples advertising same goods, and in some
cases, emails with same subject lines were clearly from different campaigns.
For each step next six characteristics were collected: number of false pos-
itives (FP), number of false negatives (FN), number of true positives (TP),
number of false negatives (FN), number of clusters, and number of outliers.
For clustering, terms "positive" and "negative" are applied to each possible pair
of samples. For example, if two samples that are supposed to be in the same
cluster are put in different clusters, it can be called false negative. If they are
put in the same cluster - true positive.
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Figure 4.2 depicts results of clustering and evaluation according to the la-
beled set. As can be seen from the figure, TP and TN rise rapidly until EPS
equal to 0.37. FP rate starts to rise from EPS 0.35. Interval of EPS from
0.26 to 0.34 gives a good amount of TP and TN, meanwhile having 0 FP and
comparably low FN. Table 4.1 depicts confusion matrix for EPS equal 0.34.
Figure 4.2: TP-FP EPS evaluation for subjects clustering. MinPts = 2
Predicted: No Predicted: Yes
Actual: No TN=263792 FP=0
Actual: Yes FN=40372 TP=79616
Table 4.1: Confusion matrix for EPS=0.34. Subjects clustering
It is common to separate labeled set on a training set and a test set to
prevent overfitting of machine learning algorithms. In this research, parame-
ters for clustering are being selected manually, so correctness of the clustering
parameters rely only on how representative labeled dataset is.
To show that labeled dataset is sufficient to select parameters, all graphs
are also created for a dataset having random 50% of the full labeled dataset.
Figure 4.3 depicts evaluation of EPS for 50% of the whole labeled set. It can
be seen that results are the same as for 100% set. Similarity of FP and TP
rates for different sizes of labeled datasets shows that increasing size of labeled
dataset will not provide more precise results for threshold selection.
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Different sizes of test datasets were tested for threshold selection for other
features too, but it did not change the selection of the threshold. Therefore
graphs for 50% datasets are omitted in future parameters estimations.
Figure 4.3: TP-FP EPS evaluation for subjects clustering. MinPts = 2. 50%
of the labeled set
Figure 4.4 shows how the number of outliers and clusters change with the
change of MinPts. It can be seen that with MinPts = 1 many more outliers
were clustered while keeping rates of TP and FP, depicted in figure 4.5, almost
the same. However, further inspection showed that it happened because with
such low MinPts clusters were created with only one email in them. After
removing 650 clusters that consisted only from one email, number of clusters
happened to be same as with MinPts = 2.
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Figure 4.4: Clusters and outliers for changing MinPts for subjects clustering.
EPS = 0.34
Figure 4.5: TP-FP for changing MinPts for subjects clustering. EPS = 0.34
MinPts was checked for all features, and it behaved the same as here. Thus
graphs are omitted. MinPts for future clustering parameters evaluation is set
to two.
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4.1.2 Bodies
As discussed in 2.1.2 section, body is optional. However, most of the spam
samples have it. Body is viewed by people who got interested in the email
by reading the subject of the email. Thus it has to be simple and engaging
enough to make the user perform some simple actions such as clicking on the
link, downloading and running the attachment or responding to the email.
Bodies are much easier to obfuscate due to the variety of formats that mod-
ern email clients support. Common methods to obfuscate body are discussed
in 2.2.4 section. Body is often present either in HTML or plaintext format.
HTML itself can also be considered as a feature for clustering. Two features
related to the HTML can be retrieved: HTML noise and DOM tree. Rendered
text can also be a feature for clustering.
HTML noise
HTML noise had been already utilized to track and cluster web spam in "Track-
ing Web Spam with Hidden Style Similarity"[44], but it had never been applied
to spam.
Noise retrieval allows recovering details of messages, such as spaces and
symbols, that are produced by the software used to generate the HTML tem-
plate for the campaign. If two different campaigns have same templates noise,
it might indicate that the same spammer is responsible for different campaigns.
However, if different actors use the same software or standards-compliant soft-
ware, the approach will give many false positives as many samples will have
similar HTML noise.
Although it still can be used to find some valuable insights in some cases,
it had been considered to be not strong enough and had been postponed for
the future.
DOM Tree
Email messages quite often have some unique structure, although it is possible
to obfuscate DOM structure for each email, often template is not changed or
changed only slightly. Thus different tags and their positions might compose
a feature that stays persistent during the campaign.
One of the advantages of this feature is that it might disclose campaigns
with completely different content but that have the same HTML template to
generate messages. Thus it can show campaigns created by the same sender.
However, this feature also has two significant disadvantages:
• Spammers can easily change the template or start using common tem-
plates to mimic legitimate mailing software
• Not all spam is HTML, so it is not a universal feature
This feature is quite promising, and it might be used in future implementa-
tions, but now it had not been selected for the implementation.
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Text
The text is present in almost every email message, although sometimes it comes
in HTML layout. Spammers are interested in a client being able to read the
text and having text to look not suspicious. Therefore, text can often be ex-
tracted from an HTML using deterministic approaches similar to those used
in HTML rendering. Three properties of the body text has been considered:
Text meaning
What is advertised or discussed in the text.
Text layout
Representing text as a complex of text fragments, URLs, and line breaks. The
text itself is excluded. This approach had been implemented and tested in
"Spam campaign detection, analysis, and investigation" research.[9]
Characters or words sequence
Perceiving body text as a sequence of characters or words that can be changed
during the campaign only slightly by replacing words or changing symbols in
them.
Body text represented as a set of identifiers has been selected for the imple-
mentation as it is the most obvious and straightforward way to cluster similar
generated text.
Many distance functions exist to compare texts[14], here some of the com-
monly used ones:
• Jaccard index based distance
Measuring distance between sets of words using Jaccard index. This
approach does not take into account words order. Complexity is O(n2)
for n size sets [8].
• Levenshtein distance
It is a memory and time intensive distance measurement. It has memory
and time complexity of O(m ∗ n) [23].
• LCS (Longest Common Substring) length
LCS will find common substrings, but it also should take into account
length of the overall message. It has no tolerance for small changes in
the text.
Jaccard index was chosen because as it is working with words and size of sets
will be much less than when working with characters in Levenshtein distance.
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Clustering is done in next steps:
1. Parse HTML and extract first 20 words from the parsed text.
Manual inspection of spam messages showed that all, or almost all, spam
messages try to provide the main idea and important content in the
first 20 words. It might be because spammers have to keep a recipient
interested from the first moment he opens the email. Otherwise, the
message will be sent to spam.
2. Filter everything except words and create sets from the sentences.
3. Calculate distance matrix from every set to every set using Jaccard index
based distance.
Jaccard index is a similarity measure. To convert it to distance metric
it must be subtracted from 1.
4. Cluster emails using DBSCAN with distance matrix.
Estimation of Clustering Parameters. The process is very similar to Levenshtein-
DBSCAN clustering showed before. Figure 4.6 depicts evaluation of TP and
FP for changing EPS. False positives go shallowly and start going up very steep
from value 0.71. True negatives reach the peak at EPS 0.67 and True positives
going up very fast from 0.48 to 0.72. According to the graph, the optimal value
is 0.70 as it provides highest true positives rates with almost no false negatives.
Figure 4.6: TP-FP EPS evaluation for bodies clustering. MinPts = 2
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Figure 4.7 depicts how the number of clusters and outliers changed with
the change of EPS. It can be noticed that starting from EPS 0.74 clusters
start to decrease faster than outliers and eventually intersect outliers graph.
It means that algorithm starts to merge clusters instead of clustering outliers.
Figure 4.7: Clusters and outliers for changing EPS for bodies clustering.
MinPts = 2
4.1.3 URLs
URLs often present in SPAM. Figure 4.8 depicts histogram of number of URLs
in the emails found in F-Secure’s spam database (10000 emails were sampled).
Emails without any URLs compose only 0.01% of the dataset.
URLs are part of spammers’ resources. Domains cost money, and it is quite
expensive to use unique domains for each email in big campaigns. Although
domain names can stay the same for different campaigns, unlike topic or similar
template, it is much less likely that different spammers share control over
same domain names. Finding campaigns that share domain names can help
to identify likeliness of campaigns to be sent by the same spammer.
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Figure 4.8: Histogram of URLs count in used dataset
Clustering
Clustering by URLs had been proposed[37][44][45][29] before and was discussed
in section 2.2.4. URLs have several features that that were considered:
• Domain names
Domain names cost money, although it is possible to create sub-domains
almost for free, it is still possible to extract domain name cutting off
sub-domains. One of the drawbacks is that some services might sell
their sub-domains or provide a service to redirect requests, for example,
URL shortener discussed in section 2.2.4. However, it will always lead
to the real server controlled by the spammer and can be extracted from
the email by following the shortened link.
• URL patterns
URL patterns are easy to change in theory, but practical experience
shows that it is often not done by spammers.
Full domains had been chosen as a feature for clustering as it is easy to imple-
ment and validate the approach.
Clustering is done in next four steps:
1. Parsing the whole body and extracting all used domain names.
2. Creating a set of used domain names.
3. Creating a distance matrix using Jaccard index based distance.
4. Running DBSCAN clustering on the calculated distance matrix.
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This approach can perform worse if spammers append fake URLs to the end
of the email or make them invisible. In that case, Jaccard index will output
significantly lower value if sets will have many different domain names. How-
ever, it is not highly likely as it will not help email message to get through the
spam filter and manual inspection showed that it does not happen in practice.
Estimation of Clustering Parameters. DBSCAN was run with different EPS
values to evaluate the results. Figure 4.9 shows overall results. As can be seen
from the picture, TP and FP values are on a significantly lower level than true
and false negatives. False negatives number is much bigger because spammers
often use different domains during one campaign.
Figure 4.10 depicts only false positives and true positives. Level of true
positives is higher from the start, and at EPS 0.31 it jumps while the number
of false positives stays the same. The second jump appears at EPS 0.5, but now
both values increased. On value 0.66 both false positives and true positives
jump, but false positives go up significantly faster than true positives.
EPS = 0.46 was chosen as the optimal value. It will provide strict infor-
mation about the similarity of used domains and will tend to provide as least
false positives as possible.
Figure 4.9: TP-FP-TN-FN EPS evaluation for URLs clustering. MinPts = 2
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Figure 4.10: TP-FP EPS evaluation for URLs clustering. MinPts = 2
4.1.4 Source IP addresses
IP address used to send an email is a very important feature that can be used
to identify the real sender. Unfortunately, based solely on a received email
message, it can be hard or even impossible to determine the real IP address
that was used to send the message. As discussed in section 2.2.4, IP address
can be forged as well as "Received" headers. Meaning that even if IP address
should always be in "received" headers list, it can be impossible to say which
one exactly is the real source IP address.
Because this feature is not reliable, it was decided to postpone it to future
researches. Some of the possible solutions might be taking several possible
addresses from the Received headers and compare them as sets.
4.1.5 Attachments
Attachments can serve different purposes that can be divided into two groups:
attachments providing additional content to the message and attachments serv-
ing as a separate payload that has to be opened by the recipient explicitly.
Each attachment has a file name and a content. The name often contains
extension and the name of the attachment. Thereby three features from each
attachment can be extracted: file name, file extension, and content.
Attachments related features are valuable and often can show that two
emails are from the same campaign.
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4.1.6 Recipients
Apart from infrastructure for sending messages, a spammer has to have recip-
ients to send spam to. Lists of email addresses usually bought or generated by
the spammer and these lists evolve through the spammer’s career. Not active
addresses are dropped, and new addresses are being added to improve profits
from sending spam. Each experienced spammer has his own sources of email
addresses thus recipients lists can be quite unique.[40] Therefore such resource
as "list of recipients" can help to identify the actors standing behind the spam
campaign.
Each email has at least one recipient and does not provide much information
about the whole spammer’s mailing list. However, if spam dataset contains
many email messages that can be definitely grouped by some other features,
for example, all of the messages have the same subject line, same body text
and same URLs inside, all recipient email addresses can be collected into one
set for that campaign. The bigger set is - the better it represents the original
list of emails that spammer used for the campaign. By counting similarity
between mailing lists of different campaigns, it might be possible to correlate
different campaigns.
4.2 Visualization
Visualization of the data is one of the key aspects of the developing tool. This
section discusses selected approach for the visualization, leaving elaboration
of specific technologies to the 5.1.3 section, which discusses implementation-
specific details.
Clustering does not reduce the amount of data. It produces more data -
cluster labels. However, produced data can be used to structure existing email
messages as sets of similar objects.
Preserving only important information helps to reduce time finding it. Thus
only important information is left for each email message:
• Subject line - allows to get quick estimation of what email is about. A
subject is always the first thing that recipient sees, so it is often a quite
good representation of the email message.
• Attachments names and SHA1s - attachments often can define email
message purpose. Many file reputation systems use SHA1s as keys for
getting more info about the file so it is often quite handy to have SHA1s
at hand. File names often allow to understand the purpose of the file
as it also contains extension in it and short name that is showed to the
recipient. In some cases the purpose of the file is obvious only from its
name.
• URLs - seeing URLs found in email allows to investigate each link by
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hands if it is needed. Also it is often obvious if it is a URL shortener,
picture, or something else.
• Way to open original email - one of the important features is to have the
ability to get all info about the email in the original form. Showing email
file path allows opening the email fast in any application, for example,
Thunderbird.
Yet one problem to solve is displaying clusters and relation between them.
One possible solution is to utilize graph concept. Each cluster can be a node,
and all emails that are in that cluster can be nodes connected to the cluster
node. Thus if one email is in two clusters, relations between these clusters
will be visible to the user. Figure 4.11 demonstrates how it might look like.
All email related information is hidden intentionally to let the reader focus on
cluster visualization and not emails themselves.
Figure 4.11 depicts 3 clusters: 31_bodies, 254_subjects, and 1635_bodies.
These clusters represent clustering by different features, according to their
names: bodies and subjects.
Yellow nodes represent emails that belong to these clusters. For example,
email 11717 belongs to 2 clusters: 254_subjects and 31_bodies.
Figure 4.11: Clusters visualization example
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The benefit of such visualization is that it is easy to see not only what
is similar and different between emails, but also how emails with all different
features still relate to each other through intermediate clusters. For example,
it is easy to see that emails 169 and 10717 have same bodies’ contents because
they are in the same cluster 31_bodies. However, 11717 is also in the cluster
254_subjects that has other five nodes that do not belong to the 31_bodies
cluster. But all these five nodes have the same bodies. Intercluster connec-
tions allow correlating different features together only by examining the graph
model.
Chapter 5
Technical implementation
Internal and external feeds are alike but still have some diversity in sizes of
spam campaigns represented in them. Also, because external feeds are bigger,
they have a better representation of small campaigns than the internal feeds.
Extracting data from the feeds is automated and can be implemented in several
lines of infrastructure-specific commands.
Working with such big amount of data requires quite thought through set
of technologies. Even simplest operation, done without thorough inspection,
can take days to run. Complexity of infrastructure and used software often
adds up to a unforgiving piece of code that will work impermissibly long even
if logic seems right. It happens because each operation is multiplied on number
of processing objects and when number of objects is huge, all imperfections of
the process pops out as spikes in memory consumption, network traffic and
processing time.
Working with the whole dataset is impractical thus sampling had been
applied to the dataset. Sampling is a way of data selection that allows to work
with lesser data keeping general properties of the whole set. Sampling for the
spam data set can be done in few ways: selecting all samples from one day
or taking samples randomly from the whole dataset. For this research, two
databases had been created with sampling.
Dataset 1 consists of 10000 emails over 2017-th year that have attach-
ments. It mostly contains malware but some emails are just spam with not
malicious. Spam usually has either attachment or URL in it. It is rare to
see those together as it increases probability of message being put into spam
because of SpamAssassin rules summing up. Thus it is rare possible to see
URL clusters working with this dataset.
Dataset 2 consists of 20000 emails over 2 days in January 2017-th. Pur-
pose of this dataset is to test the tool on continuous dataframe of real-life
data. Most of the spam is not malware and does not have attachments. Usu-
ally spammers advertise goods and provide URLs that lead recipients to the
website where they can spend their money.
5.1 Design
At the moment of writing the thesis, the system is in a proof of concept stage,
so the user has to control the whole workflow himself. However, the process
can be easily automated, and it is strictly determined. Figure 5.1 depicts the
clustering process.
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Figure 5.1: Clustering process
The program takes email messages, stored as files in a raw format, from
a given directory path, splits them on bulks of 20000 messages, and runs
clustering algorithms for each bulk. After running the dataset through the
clustering algorithms, the program creates three files, one for each clustering
algorithm. These files have to be uploaded into Neo4j database using the
functionality of Neo4j. After uploading the data, researchers can access Neo4j
database from any browser and make requests to the graph.
5.1.1 Loading and parsing emails
Data is loaded and pre-processed in an IPython notebook. Notebook loads all
email addresses from given path, parses them using "mail-parser"[41] library,
extracts useful features and saves the result as a pickle file - python serialized
object written to a file. Extracting features are:
• File path
Used to identify the message and provide additional functionality, like
displaying the original message, later.
• Subject
• Message body
Some email messages that are intended to be shown as HTML have
two bodies: first has a note that message has to be viewed in HTML-
supporting email client and second has the real message. Thus parser
extracts the last available body.
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• List of recipients
• List of attachments
For each attachment, only SHA1 and filenames are extracted. SHA1 is
counted using "hashlib" - standard python library for hash digests.
• Parsed text
HTML payloads have to be parsed, or it will interfere with body cluster-
ing as each HTML tag will be considered a separate word.
• List of email body URLs
Loading each 10000 email messages takes on average 12 seconds. One day
spam from internal spam feed can be parsed in less than a minute.
5.1.2 Clustering
All clustering algorithms, including distance matrix, are implemented as IPython
notebooks. As result of calculations, they provide a one-dimensional array of
numbers. Each i-th number is a cluster label for the i-th email sample in
the input pickle object. For each clustering, a directory is created, and result
arrays are put there as pickle files.
For the proof of concept implementation, only 3 clustering methods had
been utilized: bodies, subjects, and links. It is sufficient to evaluate the ap-
proach, but it can be improved by implementing other clustering methods.
Bodies clustering module extracts set of words from each email, calculates
distance matrix and uses DBSCAN to cluster these sets of words. The distance
matrix is calculated using distance function based on the Jaccard index.
The next algorithm processes each body text:
1. BeautifulSoup[35] library with "html5lib" parser is used to parse the
HTML body.
2. Head tag is removed including the contents.
3. Plain text is extracted using "get_text" method from BeautifulSoup.
4. URLs are being removed using the next regular expression:
(https|http)?:\/\/(\w|\.|\/|\?|\=|\&|\%)*\b
5. Plain text is tokenized with "nltk.word_tokenize", all words are made
"lowercase," and all digits and punctuation are being filtered out.
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6. Dictionary of all words is created, and integer ID is assigned to each
word. Comparing words is much more computationally demanding than
comparing numbers.
7. All words in bodies are replaced with integer IDs, and bodies are con-
verted into integer arrays with the fixed length of 20, cutting the rest of
the body. Selection of the length is discussed in the algorithms section
4.1.2. If body length is 0, then the message is excluded from clustering.
8. Similarity matrix is created by comparing all messages to all other mes-
sages using Jaccard Index. Results are stored in "ndarray" type from
"numpy" library. It allows to preserve memory [28]. Jaccard Index is
a similarity measure from 0 to 1 and not a distance. To get distance
measure, it has to be subtracted from 1.
9. DBSCAN algorithm is run with next parameters:
db = DBSCAN(
eps=0.2,
min_samples=2,
metric="precomputed",
n_jobs=-1)
labels=db.fit_predict(similarity_matrix)
metric="precomputed" tells that input is a precomputed distance matrix
n_jobs=-1 allows to use all found cores of all CPUs
eps and min_samples are DBSCAN’s parameters explained in 2.3.2 sec-
tion.
DBSCAN algorithm is implemented in "sklearn"[30] library.
10. Results are saved as a pickle file.
Domain names clustering extracts all domain names from email’s body,
combines them in sets, calculates Jaccard index based distance matrix on these
sets and clusters sets with DBSCAN. The algorithm is similar to the "bodies
clustering," but instead of words works with domain names.
1. Extract plaintext from the body.
2. Extract all URL links and keep only domain names, combine them into
a set. If set is empty, object is excluded from clustering.
3. Calculate distance matrix using Jaccard index based distance.
CHAPTER 5. TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION 44
4. Perform DBSCAN with next parameters:
db = DBSCAN(
eps=0.51,
min_samples=2,
metric="precomputed",
n_jobs=-1)
labels= db.fit_predict(similarity_matrix)
5. Results are saved as a pickle file.
Subjects clustering builds distance matrix from all subjects using Leven-
shtein distance function and performs clustering with DBSCAN algorithm.
1. Extract all subjects.
2. Calculate distance matrix using Levenshtein distance.
3. Perform DBSCAN with next parameters:
db = DBSCAN(
eps=0.34,
min_samples=2,
metric="precomputed"
,n_jobs=-1)
labels= db.fit_predict(similarity_matrix)
4. Results are saved as a pickle file.
5.1.3 Visualization
Neo4j database is utilized to visualize, store and query the results of the clus-
tering. Neo4j is a NoSQL graph database that outperforms all other graph
databases in common tasks[18] and has big developing community. It uses
Cypher query language that allows writing complex queries for the database.
Neo4j is distributed as a docker image that includes web-based graph visual-
ization and Neo4j engine.
To visualize and work with the data in Neo4j, data has to be loaded there
first. Neo4j allows loading data from CSV documents row by row, executing
CREATE queries for each row. However, firstly, CSV documents have to be
generated.
To generate CSV documents, the python3 script loads pickles with clus-
tering results and original emails to the memory. Then it generates next two
files: clusters.csv and nodes.csv.
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clusters.csv has 3 columns: cluster_type, cluster_id, email_id. Cluster_type
stores one of 3 types: bodies, subjects or links. It describes the type of cluster.
An ID of a cluster is a type of a cluster with a unique number that identifies the
cluster appended to the type. Email ID is a unique ID of email that belongs
to the cluster. The file contains all relationships between emails and clusters
that they are in.
nodes.csv has 5 columns: id, subject, sha1s, path, URLs. Columns do not
influence the internal structure and are needed to show information about
each email. Email ID is identifier that is used in clusters.csv.
Files are put into "/data" directory in the docker container and loaded into the
database using Cypher queries:
Load all emails as nodes
load csv with headers from "file:///emails.csv" as row
fieldterminator ’|’
create (:Email {
subject: row.subject,
id: toInteger(row.id),
path: row.path,
sha1s: row.sha1s,
urls: row.urls}
)
Load all clusters as nodes
load csv with headers from "file:///clusters.csv" as row
fieldterminator ’|’
merge (c:Cluster{
type: row.cluster_type,
id: row.cluster_id
})
Connect all emails to according clusters
load csv with headers from "file:///clusters.csv" as row
fieldterminator ’|’
match (c:Cluster{
id: row.cluster_id
})
match (n:Email{id:toInt(row.email_id)})
create (c)-[r:has]->(n)
To make Neo4j perform faster, nodes and relations must be indexed:
CREATE INDEX ON :Email(id)
CREATE INDEX ON :Cluster(id)
CREATE INDEX ON :Cluster(type)
After the indexing, the database is ready to be used.
Chapter 6
Evaluation
This chapter presents some results obtained by working with the tool. The
main intention of the chapter is to evaluate introduced approach and tool
implementation by providing some examples of how the tool can be used and
explain the results.
6.1 Clustering performance evaluation
The most computationally complex task is to create distance matrices for
the data. Figure 6.1 shows how the time for building the distance matrix
increases with the increase in the number of emails. It is evident that clustering
by subjects is more time complex than other methods. The reason is that
Levenshtein distance, used in subjects clustering, has higher time complexity
than Jaccard index, used in other clustering methods. Time rises in a quadratic
manner.
After building distance matrix, DBSCAN algorithm is executed. DBSCAN
has an average complexity of O(n log n) and worst of O(n2). Figure 6.2 de-
picts comparison of DBSCAN computation times. Graphs are quite similar
because in all methods DBSCAN takes already precomputed distance matri-
ces. DBSCAN computation time is neglectable compared to distance matrix
computation time. However, it rises rapidly too.
The complexity of the algorithms adds some limitations to the tool use
cases. The main limitation is that sets of data cannot be too big. However,
even with this limitation, the tool provides significant value. It can be used
to provide statistics for relatively short periods of time, or it can be used for
longer periods with the use of sampling. Next section discusses practical use
cases and what can be achieved with the developed software.
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Figure 6.1: Time complexity comparison for distance matrix creation
Figure 6.2: Time complexity comparison for DBSCAN clustering
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6.2 Practical results
The developed tool provides quite valuable output and can be used to easily
detect very complex campaigns that cannot be easily extracted with any other
tool that is used in the company. In this section, several use cases are being
discussed to show what kind of insights can be gained with the developed tool
on real data.
6.2.1 Synonym swapping
Synonym swapping method, as discussed in 2.2.4 section, allows to generate
unique sentences using sets of interchangeable words and collocations that are
composed together randomly. This approach allows generating big amounts of
different email subjects and bodies where most of the randomly taken pairs of
samples will have only a few words in common. Such campaigns are not easy
to disclose even to humans. Fortunately, the developed tool can handle such
campaigns.
DBSCAN, utilized for subjects and bodies clustering, can follow the cluster,
combining all nearby objects. Thus if spam feed contains enough samples, DB-
SCAN will combine close ones to the point where all or most of the generated
texts will be in one cluster.
Dataset 2 contains a few campaigns with generated subject lines. After
running clusterization for the dataset, 400 messages were clustered into the
same cluster. All messages cannot be disclosed due to the NDA restrictions.
However, synonyms state machine had been recreated from the messages, and
it is depicted in figure 1. Although synonyms tables have been known for a
long time, this example shows capabilities of the tool to find such generated
campaigns. Knowing the table used for generation, such spam campaign can
be mitigated by blacklisting all possible combinations.
6.2.2 Tracking by features
Spammers often change some parameters of the campaigns to improve the
effectiveness of the campaign. However, some features stay the same. One
campaign can undergo many changes during a long time and often set of fea-
tures changes completely, so it is no longer possible to cluster two messages
without intermediate ones.[29]
Correlating completely different sets of features by tracking the transitions
is a novelty that this research introduces. It is achieved due to clustering
by different methods and connecting intersecting clusters together, visualizing
results as a graph.
Here are some examples of visualized campaigns, showing how complicated
feature transitions can be and how developed tool makes understanding the
data easier.
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Parcels campaigns.
Figure 6.3 demonstrates part of one campaign as a graph. Clusters are blue
nodes, emails are yellow nodes. Picture depicts several overlapping clusters:
27_subjects overlaps with 16_bodies, and 16_bodies overlaps with 37_subjects.
An overlap means that some emails got into two clusters in the same time.
Table 6.1 shows contents of the highlighted messages.
Figure 6.3: Clustering by tracking changes of features
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ID Subject Body
1 Delivery Problem, FedEx
Package #xxxxxxxxx
Hello, Your order is here, but our de-
livery representative was not able to de-
liver the package. Important details can
be found in the confirmation document at-
tached. Thanks for your consideration.
Sibby Glander - FedEx Expedited Supervi-
sor
2 Delivery Failed, FedEx
Package #xxxxxxxxx
Hello, By this letter, we’d like to let you know
that we’ve tried to deliver your package to-
day. Additional information about your par-
cel is in the shipment notice enclosed. We’re
glad to help you any time. Letta Czap -
FedEx Delivery
3 We couldn’t deliver your
package #xxxxxxxxx
Hello, By this letter we’d like to inform
you that we’ve tried to deliver your package
#xxxxxxxxx today. Additional information
about your parcel is in the shipment notice
enclosed. Thanks for using FedEx. Adaline
Casper - FedEx Expedited Delivery
4 We couldn’t deliver your
package #xxxxxxxxx
Hello, Delivery status notification: our de-
livery representative was not able to deliver
your package today. We kindly ask you to
check the delivery confirmation attached for
more details. Thank you for using FedEx.
Ysabel Shilleh - FedEx Delivery Agent
Table 6.1: Features used to cluster parcels campaign
As can be seen from the table 6.1, messages 1 and 4 do not have anything
in common. Messages 1 and 2 have almost identical subject lines but have
different bodies thus they are in the same cluster - 27_subjects. Messages 2
and 3 have different subject lines but identical body messages that were easily
clustered into 16_bodies cluster. However, message 3 and message 1 do not
have anything in common: subjects are different as well as bodies. Message 3
and message 4, on the other hand, have identical subjects. Although message
1 and message 4 do not share any features, by tracking changes it can be as-
sumed that they were sent by the same actor as part of one campaign.
Malware correlation.
For this example we have a hash of malicious file that came from some spam
campaign and we want to find all attachments that came from the same cam-
paign. To do that we can query all nodes that are closer than 10 nodes away.
Here is the query that does that, sorting attachments by distance (hash is
randomized):
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION 51
match (e:Email)-[r*1..10]-(s) , p = shortestPath((e)-[*]-(s))
where e.att_sha1s contains "317296*3ca4"
and s.att_names contains ".zip"
return distinct s.path,s.att_names,s.att_sha1s,length(p)
order by length(p)
The queried subgraph is depicted in figure 6.4. Table 2 contains all ex-
tracted attachments. As can be seen from the table, most of the attachments
pretend to be from a delivery company. Thorough checking using internal file
reputation systems also show that all of them contain malware from one family.
Figure 6.4: Subgraph of campaign distributing malware pretending to be a
delivery service
However, suggested approach can sometimes provide false positives in cases
where different campaigns accidentally appeared to have same features. For
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example, at the end of the table 2, few attachments look differently. "warez_-
tear.zip" does not look like part of the delivery campaign. Figure 6.5 is part of
subgraph explaining the connection. The problem is in node 1. It accidentally
has the same name as node 3 and same body as node 2. Node 2 has attachment
"warez_tear.zip" that is not part of the delivery campaign.
Figure 6.5: Wrong connection between clusters
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6.2.3 Same identity clustering
Sometimes seemingly different campaigns get clustered together. However, it
does not always mean that clustering is incorrect. Sometimes spammers leave
same features in different campaigns, disclosing that the same spammer had
sent those campaigns.
Amazon and Flashlights. In this example, spammers sent a few messages
of the new campaign, using domain names from the old one. It might be due
to a mistake, or it might be that domain from the last campaign did not get
banned and it was still profitable to send messages storing content on it.
Figure 6.6 depicts these two campaigns. One campaign is a phishing cam-
paign that tricks people into thinking that they received a message from Ama-
zon. Second is advertising flashlights. Nodes 1 and 3 do not have any common
features. Even topic is different. However, messages 1 and 2 have same domain
names. Messages 2 and 3 share common subjects. Exact feature values can be
seen in the table 6.2.
Id Subjects Domains
1 Free Military Grade Tac-
tical Flashlight!! Limited
Time Only
[imagizer.imageshack.us,
leadecompany.cricket]
2 Your amazon prime points
are about to expire
[imagizer.imageshack.us,
leadecompany.cricket]
3 WARNING your amazon
points are about to expire
[www.home8they.cricket]
Table 6.2: Features used to connect Amazon and Flashlights campaigns
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Figure 6.6: Different campaigns clustered because of common resource
6.3 Researchers’ comments
Two spam researchers from F-Secure have been asked to try the tool, tell if
they would like to see the tool as part of their workflow and provide comments
in a free form.
Both researchers found the tool capable of improving the workflow but had
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a bit different opinions on how to integrate it. One suggestion was to use it
as an independent tool for research. Another was to integrate just results of
clustering into the existing database with spam as campaign labels. Here are
some other comments:
Can be part of the spam workflow. Both researchers said that they want
to see the tool as part of their workflow. In one case as a complete tool for
research, in another - as part of the existing system.
Learning curve is shallow. It took less than an hour to figure out the
concepts and start performing rather complex queries. The Neo4j basic user
interface allows using a mouse to navigate a graph and expand nodes.
Tool does not provide sufficient statistics mechanisms that are avail-
able in current implementation. Neo4j allows to use third-party visualiza-
tion modules, but it still needs further research. One way is to transfer results
of clustering, supervised by a researcher, to another database that can provide
some dashboard. Another option might be to write a tool for visualizing the
results. This part still needs some research to find the optimal way of provid-
ing a statistical overview of campaigns.
6.4 Comparison with previous work
Approach in this paper was influenced by the "Mining Spam Email to Identify
Common Origins for Forensic Application"[45] research. Main similarity is
that both researches use a set of features simultaneously to correlate spam.
However, some key differences allow to achieve better results.
"Mining Spam Email to Identify Common Origins for Forensic Application"
used graphs only to reduce false positives, created by the agglomerative clus-
tering. Clustering implementation combines existing clusters by a new feature
each iteration. Each iteration is very simple, features are compared directly,
without machine learning techniques. So, for example, if two messages differ
by a few characters, they will not be clustered.
After getting too big cluster, researchers decided to split it using graph
approach. Graph approach used two features: subject line and domain name.
Domain names were presented as nodes and subject lines that had been sent
from two different domains were depicted as edges connecting these domains.
In this thesis, machine learning techniques are used to detect patterns and
close features in the first place. It is done several times by different features,
and each feature clustering returns already some results. For example, subject
lines are clustered by Levenshtein distance and DBSCAN. It already allows to
detect campaigns with subjects, generated using synonym swapping technique,
as shown in section 6.2.1.
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Graph theory is used to correlate intersections of these results. It allows
to mitigate false negatives by combining small campaigns into bigger ones and
allows to do deeper analysis of the existing clusters, like reducing false positives
as it is done in "Mining Spam".
Results are hard to compare as datasets are different. However, in each
research use of graphs helped improving the base approach. In this research it
had been shown as examples of usage.
6.5 Requirement fulfillment
Implemented tool meets all the requirements stated in 3 chapter. Table 6.3
depicts all the requirements and how they were fulfilled. It allows to evaluate
relevance of developed software to what researchers expected in the beginning
of the research.
Requirement Fulfilled
FR1: Clustering Yes
FR2: Searching Yes
NFR1: Performance Partially
NFR2: Visualization Yes
NFR3: Learning curve Yes
Table 6.3: Evaluation of requirements fulfillment
FR1: Clustering.
Emails are being clustered on two levels. The first level is machine learning
clustering. The second is clustering by correlating emails through existing
clusters.
FR2: Searching.
To search through the data, Neo4j uses Cypher.[16] Cypher is a graph query
language, providing a way to match patterns of nodes and relations in a graph.
It had been originally released in 2007 and still evolving.
NFR1: Performance.
Performance was achieved partially. The requirement was regarding being able
to analyze data in real time, and it is fulfilled because searching and working
with the data is handled by Neo4j in real time. The slow side is clustering,
and it depends on the size of the dataset. Clustering of 1-day data will not
take more than one hour for companies’ feeds. For longer periods of time, it
can be run overnight or even several days.
NFR2: Visualization.
Visualization satisfied researchers. However, Neo4j allows using third-party
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frameworks for visualization.
NFR3: Learning curve.
Researchers were happy with the learning curve. They managed to start work-
ing with the data in the first hour.
Chapter 7
Discussion
Clustering email messages by several features can combine loosely related mes-
sages into spam campaigns and find campaigns that likely to have a common
sender. Possible suitable features to perform such clustering are: subjects,
bodies, embedded links. Clustering by several features can be visualized as a
graph, where each cluster of each type and each email are presented as nodes
and email belonging to a cluster represented as an edge. Results show that
this approach allows to track changes applied to campaigns and get better
visibility over the spam landscape.
Developed tool allows to improve analysis of spam campaigns and get more
thorough information about spam actors. In practical sense it means that in
specific cases researcher will spend less time and effort to achieve same results.
Also it allows to perform more complex tasks on the campaigns, resulting in
better understanding of the biggest malware distribution mechanism.
Because of spam being so popular among threat actors, many related re-
searches has been held. "Spam campaign detection, analysis, and investiga-
tion" [9], "Clustering Spam Campaigns with Fuzzy Hashing" [3], "Mining Spam
Email to Identify Common Origins for Forensic Application"[45], and "Fast and
Effective Clustering of Spam Emails based on Structural Similarity" [37] laid
a background for this work and inspired to combine approaches together.
This thesis takes vague idea using graphs to correlate spam, introduced
in "Mining Spam Email to Identify Common Origins for Forensic Applica-
tion"[45], and, with use of other features tested in other researches, introduces
a way of correlating messages. This research makes the next step from clus-
tering messages by a single feature to clustering messages by several feature
and using intersection of clusters as additional information. Although some
related works implement more sophisticated and advanced methods for clus-
tering, the main novelty of this work is utilizing different existing approaches,
combining them with a graph theory, and presenting as a graph for future use
by a human.
In the beginning of the research, expectations were that it can improve some
existing methods by covering "blind spots" through adding features. Evalua-
tion of the results shows that intermediate messages play an important role
in spam. Sometimes it reveals mistakes or negligent use of resources that al-
lows to assume common actors, sometimes it allows to track what features
campaigns change through time, sometimes it can reveal big campaigns that
underwent changes during the dispatch and would not be clustered by single
feature.
Unfortunately, connecting loosely relating campaigns might lead to connec-
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tion between unrelated campaigns that just use common features, for example,
short subject like "Re:" or "hi". Frequency of such wrong connections depends
on the dataset. However, for tested datasets it was clear in all cases and re-
searchers could easily resolve the problem by removing few nodes from the
graph.
Scalability is another issue that had been left out of the focus of the re-
search. One of the possible solutions is to merge clusters created from smaller
batches of data. However, the most computationally complex parts are clus-
tering algorithms and they can be replaced without changing the results of the
research.
Nevertheless, current proof of concept implementation already has some
value for the researchers. It received very good comments and working with
real data proved prior knowledge about some campaigns.
This research shows a way to combine clustering algorithms together to
get more valuable information from spam. However, many things can be im-
proved. Here are a few possible future research directions:
Improving clustering algorithms
Complexity of utilized algorithms can be reduced by changing way of process-
ing features and by changing clustering algorithms themselves.
Trying other features
Only 3 features had been implemented for the research. Adding features
can give more information about relation between campaigns but it also can
produce connectivity between unrelated campaigns. Thus features should be
added cautiously.
Recipients clustering
Recipients clustering has been introduced in section 4.1.6. It uses similarities
between lists of recipients for already found spam campaigns to detect rela-
tions between different campaigns. Researching this method might give more
valuable information about spam actors.
Researching the graph
This research introduces the graph of email clusters. Next step would be to find
optimal and automated ways of working with such graph to extract valuable
information without the researcher.
Removing connections between unrelated campaigns can also be another
way of improving the results. It might be possible to achieve by calculating the
flow between two nodes to determine their connectivity and cutting weakest
connections when flow is less than the threshold.
Visualization
Visualization for this research is done by default Neo4j visualization frame-
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work. Neo4j has many other visualization frameworks that might suit better,
such as KeyLines [42].
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis describes the theory and implementation of a new approach for
spam clustering and analysis. Proof of concept software was implemented and
tested as part of research for F-Secure, a large Finnish cybersecurity company.
Spam constitutes more than half of all email traffic and it is the main
vector of infecting users with malware.[27] Therefore, spam is one of the most
important sources of information for security companies.
Spammers use many different techniques to avoid spam filters, which com-
plicates the email analysis. Email subjects and message bodies are dynamically
generated, headers with source IP addresses are forged, and the domain names
are frequently replaced with new ones.
Existing email analysis tools allow the analyst to group messages together
for further analysis. Unfortunately, most of them cluster email by one feature
or one set of features, requiring all messages in cluster to match on these
features. Therefore, they miss information about how the spam campaign
changed through time and how likely it is for different campaigns to have a
common sender. Although one source [45] presents an approach for correlating
different campaigns together, it utilizes only two features and does not take
into account slightly changed feature values. For example, if two subject lines
have one different word, they will be processed as unrelated subjects.
To improve spam analysis, we have developed new clustering techniques.
The clustering happens in two stages. In the first stage, messages are clustered
several times by different features in such way that an independent set of
clusters is generated for each feature. In second stage, emails clusters are
presented as a graph where each email and each cluster are vertices and the
relation of an email to a cluster is expressed as an edge. Such representation
allows us to easily see intersections of clusters and to track changes made
to the campaign. These relations are visualized with a graph database and
visualization tool, Neo4j, that provides graphical and textual query capabilities
to browse and search the graph.
To evaluate the approach, it was tested on real data provided by F-Secure.
The developed tool managed to prove its usefulness by helping to find and
visualize complex spam campaigns. One of the demonstrated abilities is being
able to find spam campaigns that changed all their features over time. Such
messages would be impossible to cluster without following the graph through
intermediate messages that connect them. However, after the connection is
found, a human can easily verify that these messages are part of the same
campaign. The developed tool allows analysts to find such campaigns auto-
matically.
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To evaluate usability of the tool, we interviewed security analysts, who
agreed that suggested tool gives valuable insight and should be integrated into
the internal analysis systems of F-Secure.
One interesting problem to solve was the feature selection, i.e. which email
features can be used to find connections between spam campaigns. Besides
finding textually similar campaigns, our approach is able to find campaigns
that shared some resources at some point, for example, domain name in URL.
This can be used to combine campaigns by common sender. The work on
feature selection could still be continued.
The most important remaining open question is how the search for valuable
information can be reliably automated. One of the use cases for our techniques
is to provide daily statistics about the incoming threat-intelligence data. Un-
fortunately, accidentally shared features sometimes cause false clustering and
we currently rely on the human expect to confirm the tool findings. New graph
algorithms could possibly mitigate false clustering.
In summary, the tool developed in this thesis project can also provide valu-
able information for governmental organizations to identify major spammers
and for security companies to get a better understanding of the spam land-
scape. Based on state-of-the-art data mining techniques, it finds non-obvious
connections between messages and reduces the amount of data that needs to
be shown to the human analyst. With a rich search engine and usable visual-
ization, it provides an easy way to work with spam campaigns instead of single
messages.
Appendix A
Attachment name Graph path
Delivery-Details.zip 2
UPS-Package-XXXXX.zip 2
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 2
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 2
UPS-Label-XXXXX.zip 2
UPS-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 2
Delivery-Details.zip 2
Delivery-Details.zip 2
Delivery-Details.zip 2
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 4
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 4
UPS-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 4
UPS-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 4
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 4
UPS-Label-XXXXX.zip 4
UPS-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 4
Delivery-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 4
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 4
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 4
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 4
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 4
UPS-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 4
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 4
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 4
UPS-Delivery-XXXXX.zip 4
UPS-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 4
Delivery-Details.zip 4
UPS-Delivery-XXXXX.zip 4
Delivery-Details.zip 4
Delivery-Details.zip 4
UPS-Package-XXXXX.zip 4
UPS-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 4
Delivery-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 6
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UPS-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 6
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Delivery-XXXXX.zip 6
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Delivery-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 6
Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
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Ground-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Delivery-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
UPS-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Delivery-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
UPS-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Package-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
UPS-Package-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
UPS-Delivery-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Delivery-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Label-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
UPS-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
Delivery-Details.zip 6
Delivery-Receipt-XXXXX.zip 8
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 8
UPS-Label-XXXXX.zip 8
UPS-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 8
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 8
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 8
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 8
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 8
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 8
Undelivered-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 8
Item-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 8
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 8
Undelivered-Package-XXXXX.zip 8
Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 8
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Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
UPS-Label-XXXXX.zip 8
UPS-Delivery-Details-XXXXX.zip 8
UPS-Package-XXXXX.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
FedEx-Parcel-ID-XXXXXXX.zip 8
FedEx-Label-ID-XXXXXXX.zip 8
FedEx-Parcel-ID-XXXXXXX.zip 8
FedEx-Delivery-ID-XXXXXXX.zip 8
FedEx-Package-ID-XXXXXXX.zip 8
FedEx-Label-ID-XXXXXXX.zip 8
FedEx-Label-ID-XXXXXXX.zip 8
FedEx-Label-ID-XXXXXXX.zip 8
UPS-Delivery-XXXXX.zip 8
FedEx-Delivery-ID-XXXXXXX.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 8
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
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Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
s.erhart_XXXXX.zip 10
warez_tear.zip 10
NFE-Compra-Realizada-com-sucesso.zip 10
NFE-Compra-Realizada-com-sucesso.zip 10
NFE-Compra-Realizada-com-sucesso.zip 10
NFE-Compra-Realizada-com-sucesso.zip 10
NFE-Compra-Realizada-com-sucesso.zip 10
NotaFisca-XXXXX.zip 10
NotaFisca-XXXXX.zip 10
NotaFisca-XXXXX.zip 10
NF-Fiscal-XXXXX.zip 10
nota fical do pagamento_XXXXX (2).zip 10
UPS-Parcel-ID-XXXXX.zip 10
Delivery-Details.zip 10
Table 2: Extracted attachments from campaign distributing malware pretend-
ing to be a delivery service (identificators were replaced with "X")
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Generated text
Are you ready to amaze your gf today?
Do you want to gratify your woman at night?
Do you want to impress your lover this night?
Are you ready to please your female partner at night?
Do you wish to please your lover at night?
Do you desire to please your lady this night?
Do you wish to impress your lover every night?
Do you desire to amaze your girlfriend this night?
Do you want to see her satisfied tonight?
Do you want to impress your wife today?
Are you ready to surprise your loved one this night?
Do you desire to see her pleased tonight?
Are you ready to amaze your girl at night?
Do you want to impress your loved one this night?
Do you desire to amaze your lady today?
Do you want to surprise your female partner at night?
Are you ready to satisfy your wife tonight?
Do you desire to amaze your babe tonight?
Do you want to please your lover tonight?
Do you wish to impress your woman this night?
Table 1: Example of synonym swapping generated subjects
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Figure 1: Graph representation of the synonym table extracted from a real-
world dataset
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